Final preparation – part 3

Excerpts from WHY WE STRUCK by Major Adewale Ademoyega; an active participant’s account by one of the prime movers of the military coup

In view of this, we had to move fast but also with much caution, as the atmosphere was intensely charged both politically and militarily. In such a circumstance, discussions with other officers had to be carefully made. Yet there was one arrangement that we had left till the date was fixed. It was the arrangement for the release of political prisoners, particularly Chief Awolowo. Now that our own date had been tentatively fixed for mid-January, it became necessary to gear up that arrangement.

At the end of the first week in January, Major Anuforo and I arranged to meet Captain Udeaja, a young engineering graduate from the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, UK. We met in Major Chukwuka’s house at the Ikeja Cantonment, but Chukwuka himself was not there. Having briefed Udeaja generally and got his consent, we gave him his task. He was to fly in a special plane provided for the purpose to calabar on the morning of the D-Day, to effect the release of Chief Awolowo and bring him to Lagos on the plane. We had already arranged for a plane of the Nigerian Air Force to be made available for that morning. This was done through Major Nzegwu (not Nzeogwu) of the Air Force. The Captain was to be assisted by a young officer on the D-Day.

Udeaja accepted this task and soon left Anuforo and I to continue with our discussions. About twenty minutes later, Anuforo suddenly gripped me and said, “Look, Wale, there is nothing stopping Udeaja from revealing the whole plan to Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Unegbe with whom he was known to be quite close. Of course, Unegbe would have immediately given the whole plan to Brigadier Maimalari, who in turn would have related everything to Balewa. In the twinkling of an eye, we jumped into my sports car. I had never sped so fast within the metropolis of Lagos. Within seventeen minutes, we were at the gate of the Officer’s Mess, Apapa. We met Captain Udeaja just coming out of the Mess.

“Where are you going?’’, we asked him. He replied that he was going to see Colonel Unegbe. In another minute, he would have driven off, and we would have been finished without having struck a single blow. We called him into my quarter in the Mess and warned him of the danger of revealing the plan to Unegbe. That night, he did not go to see Unegbe.

But the long-dreaded blow fell on us earlier that week. Major Chude-Sokei had left for India, and before his departure, he could not find a substitute for our operations in Enugu and Benin. Once again, Ifeajuna and I went to work. It took another week to find a young officer, Lieutenant Oguchi,who was to return to Enugu after a short course in Lagos. This young officer was briefed on his assignments, which were simply the arrest of Premier Okpara of the East and Premier Osadebay of the Mid-West and their right-hand men.

As a young officer, Lieutenant Oguchi was not competent to move a lot of troops out of his unit. But acting discreetly, he could move anything up to a platoon of thirty men. To justify himself in case of any serious challenge, he had to be covered by an order given him by a senior officer. But his unit, the first Battalion based in Enugu, was under the operational command of the 2nd Brigage Major (BM). He would therefore be covered by an order given by the BM. This was not the correct military procedure, but it would do. Hence, the subaltern was given written orders to carry out the operation on the H-Hour of the D-Day. Lieutenant Oguchi took the order and promised to comply.

This young officer left Lagos on January 13, just about the time the D-Day was fixed. He therefore had the correct idea of our final timing. However, he was to wait for the “order to move” which was to be officially communicated to him over the Army net communications on the D-Day.

Events moved very fast that month. By January 10, I was again in Kaduna. Through some senior civil servants I telephoned, I was able to confirm that he Umra Hadj group led by the Sardauna would be back in Kaduna on January 12 and 13. It had been confirmed in Lagos that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference was due to end on the 12th and that most of the delegates would leave Lagos almost immediately. Therefore, Nzeogwu and I fixed the D-Day for Saturday, January 15. I was to confirm this by signal from Lagos.

When I returned to Lagos, Ifeajuna and I resumed work to confirm movements and date. On January 12, I moved my luggage from the Apapa Mess to Ikoyi to stay in one of the quarters belonging to the Federal Guards’ Mess, in preparation for the D-Day. By the 13th, our new officer for Enugu and Benin had departed. Our operations were now being finalized. Therefore, I sent a signal through the Army Communication network to Nzeogwu saying, “Major Ademoyega will leave Lagos after forty-one days holiday and will arrive in Kaduna after fifty-one days.” In simple terms, this meant that the coup would take off on the night of the 14th and continue into the morning of the 15th. So, the die was cast.

Late on the 14th, news reached us that the Sardauna had been having a meeting in Kaduna on that day with Chief Akintola of the West, and that both Brigadier Ademulegun and Lieutenant-Colonel Largema were in attendance. It was obvious to us that they might be putting final touches to their planned “walloping of the West”. But we felt confident that we were already one step ahead.

The D-Day

The H-Hour by which all actions must commence had been fixed for 0200 hours, January 15. The officer who was to execute the plan in Enugu and Benin had left Lagos on the 13th and had only to be notified to carry on within the early hours on the 15th. The officer who was to operate in Ibadan was based at Abeokuta. He,too, was a relatively young officer, although he was commanding his own unit which was the 2 Field Battery, a unit under the command of 2nd Brigade.

Captain Nwobosi had reported to Lagos early on the 14th and obtained written orders from Ifeajuna, commanding him to carry out the Ibadan operation. Again, this did not follow the laid down procedure but served as a cover. Nwobosi returned to Abeokuta before nightfall. His own unit, which was newly formed, had no transport. Therefore, he went to the 2nd Reconnaissance Squadron in the same barracks. Pretending that he had a genuine message from Major Obienu, the Squadron Commander, he told the Squadron Captain, Remawa, to supply him with a Land Rover and a 3-ton truck. The latter did.

Before midnight, Nwobosi and his second-in-command were ready to move with about twenty-five of their Battery men. At midnight, Nwobosi was waiting by the telephone to receive the final order from Lagos to move. At about 2300 hours, a group of officers were assembled at the military quarter of Major Ifeajuna at Apapa. These included the officers who took-part in the planning of the coup namely, Ifeajuna, Anuforo, Okafor Chukwuka and myself. With us were a number of young officers: Captains and Subalterns who had only just been summoned from the Officers’ Mess for the operations. Not more than two of them had previous knowledge of the operation. One of these was a staff officer working with Ifeajuna and the other was a subaltern working with Major Okafor.

Two officers were conspicuously absent from the gathering. One was Major Obienu, Commander of the 2nd Reconnaissance Squadron based at Abeokuta. He had been briefed well in advance and was supposed to attend this gathering so that after the address, he would proceed to Abeokuta to bring his armoured vehicles to backup our Lagos operation. It was thought that he mighty yet turn up and we kept our expectation of him alive. The other was the young Captain who at the first light of day, was to fly in a special plane to Calabar to effect the release of Chief Awolowo. He, too, had not turned up, and we expected that he would do so later.

We were all addressed by Ifeajuna who highlighted the political situation in the Federation, pointing out that the politicians had failed the people. In effect, there was nothing to follow the political chaos except the disintegration of the country, unless there were men of goodwill who would rally round to fight for the survival of their country. Now that the moment of action had come, it was essential for those called upon to rise to the occasion. The response of the young officers was enthusiastic and almost unanimous. Only one Captain asked to be excused. But he was soon persuaded to stay.

After this, officers were allocated to their various duties. Major Ifeajuna and two subalterns were to arrest the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar and the Federal Minister for Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh. Major Anuforo and one subaltern were to arrest Colonel K. Mohammed and Lieutenant-Colonel Unegbe. Major Okafor, one Captain and a subaltern were assigned to arrest Major-General Ironsi and Brigadier Maimalari. Major Chukwuka and a subaltern were to arrest Lieutanant-Colonel Pam. Major Ademoyega, a captain and three subalterns were to occupy and control all strategic locations of the Federal Capital, including the control room at Lion Building (the Police headquarters) the P & T. Telephone Exchange, Parliament Building, the Nigeria External Telecommunications Operations Room and the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). This group was also to set up road blocks at strategic locations, and Major Ademoyega was to make the early morning broadcast over the NBC.

As soon as the duties were allotted, we all moved to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters where troops were called out and ordered to get into their combat suits and bear their arms for Internal Security operations. At the same time, Abeokuta was contacted by telephone and Nwobosi was ordered to go ahead. A signal was sent to Enugu, ordering Oguchi also to go ahead. Arms and ammunition were issued to officers and men from the Brigade Headquarters armoury. For transport, Land Rovers and 30-tonners were laid out and shared between the groups. Those who had no military transports were to use their personal cars. At 0200 we dispersed to carry out our various duties. We were to re-assemble, after our initial tasks had been completed, at the Federal Guards’ Officers Mess, Dodan Barracks, so as to review our successes and re-allocate duties for the second phase.

The second phase had previously been arranged as follows:

The completion of any uncompleted tasks of Phase 1;

The occupation and control of the various military units in Lagos including the Army Headquarters to effect a favourable disposition of all troops

Immediate link up with the out stations, Abeokuta, Kaduna and Enugu;The control of the Airport and

The initial broadcast over the network of the NBC

I took my own group straight to the P. & T. Exchange, with a view to cutting off any further use of the telephones. I ordered those at the control room to stop forthwith to link up callers and they did. But the automatic system was not easy to put out of action. I ordered the workers to take me to the switch-gear but they led me to the basement of the building and showed me that it was not accessible to them. Therefore, I ordered the technicians to start the manual disconnection of the automatic linkages. They obeyed under the watchful supervision of a subaltern and a few of the junior ranks.

Next, I was at the Lion Building. At both the Security Desk on the ground floor and at the Control Room upstairs, I told the officers and men on duty that the army was engaged on special operations. I ordered them not to receive or transmit messages by radio or telephone and I instructed a subaltern and some men to see that my orders were carried out.

After that, I was at the NET and I went straight to the officer in charge and ordered him to stop receiving and transmitting any messages whatsoever. He obeyed. I then detailed a subaltern and some junior ranks to take charge and see that my orders remained effective.

I drove straight to the NBC which was yet closed down. It was at 0320 hours. I posted a few other ranks under the command of a sergeant to the station to hold the ground until I had returned much later, to make a broadcast on the events. After that, I posted a few other ranks to the Parliament Buildings. I also ordered road blocks to be set up at strategic positions on the two main exits from Lagos to Ojota via Maryland, and Lagos to Agege via Mushin.

After this, I was at the Federal Guards Officers’ Mess, Ikoyi. Close on my heels came Major Anuforo’s group. They had accomplished their own tasks, having arrested Colonel K. Mohammed. Lieutenant-Colonel Unegbe had resisted arrest and in the scuffle he had been shot. Next came Major Chukwuka’s group. They had accomplished their own task also, having arrested Lieutenant-Colonel Pam. After them came Ifeajuna’s group. They too accomplished their task, having arrested the Prime Minister and the Federal Finance Minister. In addition, as they were returning to base, they saw Brigadier Maimalari escaping from the attempts of the Okafor’s group to arrest him. They (the Ifeajuna Group) wanted to arrest him, but in the scuffle he was shot.

I went out to look for Okafor’s group. I met Okafor himself coming from the Federal Guards’ Barracks.

“What has happened to you and what have you achieved?” I shouted at him.

I have just lost my command, “Okafor said slowly. The news sent cold sweat through my spine. I almost shivered

“Oh, no! what have you done wrong? What’s all these about?’

“I spoke to my RSM just now, and he nearly shot me. He said the GOC had been to the barracks. I did not meet him there, “explained Okafor.

“What! Did he escape from you?’’ I asked.

“I went to his house to arrest him. I found that he was not there. He had not yet returned from the party.”

“Which party’’ I asked. “Everybody had left the party since nine last night.’’

“No, it was another party. He had been to another party after Maimalari’s party. Now he had been in here. He commanded the troops not to take any orders from me and none of them would obey me now. In fact they were ready to shoot me.

It was shocking. It was horrible. If we could no longer use the Federal Guards, what troops could we use? Where were the men? Which was the force to rely upon?

“Why was it that your own group did not achieve anything?’’ I asked Okafor. No answer. I returned to the main group at the Officers’ Mess. Okafor came along with his bad news that General Ironsi had not been found at home when he went there. He was said to have gone to another party after Maimalari’s. But he had since surfaced at the Dodan Barracks and succeeded in raising troops against us, claiming that he did not know what was happening.

After that, he was said to have driven to the 2nd Battalion barracks at Ikeja to raise more troops against us. Yet none of the other groups had seen him to accost and arrest him!

The news of Ironsi’s escape came as a shock to all of us. If the Federal Guards were already made hostile, then the Officers’ Mess was no longer tenable to us. It could no longer be used as our tactical headquarters. What was our answer to this new development? There were only two possible safety valves. One, we had many road blocks inside the city. If Ironsi had got into the hands of own troops they would have arrested him. Two, if Major Obienu had reported at the outskirts of the town as he was previously ordered, he would be available to us for a fight against Ironsi.

Since Obienu did not turn up at all on January 14 to confirm his preparedness for action, we were not sure whether or not he had turned up with his squadron. It would be a good thing if he had come. We needed to link up with him. The rendezvous had been previously fixed at Airport junction on Abeokuta Road.

At this juncture, it became totally untactical to keep carrying the arrested military officers with us. For one thing, they too were highly skilled military tacticians and could turn the situation to their own advantage. For another, the situation had become somewhat slippery and we needed to be on our toes. It was at this moment that those officers were taken away and shot. It was also at this point that Lieutenant-Colonel Largema who had only arrived in Lagos late on the 14th, bringing down Sardauna’s last message on “the walloping of the west”, was arrested and shot.

After all these, Ifeajuna, Okafor and a few young officers left the Officers’ Mess for the place of our scheduled rendezvous. They still had the arrested Prime Minister with them. They were soon followed by Anuforo, who carried a few young officers with him in two private cars. Chukwuka followed in a Land Rover. He too had some young officers with him. I trailed behind them in a Land Rover, followed by a three-tonner. I had some young officers and many soldiers in the three tonner. The bodies of the fallen officers were there, and so also was the arrested Federal Finance Minister.

As we drove through the township, I asked at the checkpoints if Ironsi had been sighted. The first was at the Idumota approach to the old Carter Bridge. Yes, indeed. They had seen his staff car when they were just setting up the Road Block. It had driven off without being checked. By that account, he had passed the place soon after three o’clock. He had had a full hour to have settled himself at the 2nd Battalion location if nobody had stopped him. Other road blocks had not seen him at all.

Soon, I was at the rendezvous on Agege Motor Road, at the Airport Road junction. Anuforo’s Group were there. No ferrets (armoured vehicles) from Abeokuta. No trace of Ifeajuna’s Group. Chukwuka’s Group had not come. Why? Ifeajuna was driving ahead of Anuforo and did not seem to have stopped at all at the rendezvous. Anuforo had sent an officer to the gate of the Ikeja Cantonment. There were no signs of the ferrets or Ifeajuna’s group. But the 2nd Battalion had been roused by Ironsi and they were already holding the gate in full strength. It became obvious that Major Obienu had defaulted altogether. Even then, where now was Ifeajuna? “He could be waiting for us further out of town’’, explained Anuforo.